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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
This case involves a boundary line dispute in Bonner County, Idaho. On April 19, 2010, 
The Plaintiffs/Respondents Jean Coleman, Terri Boyd-Davis, and Brian Davis (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Coleman") pled ownership of a portion of the Appellant/Defendants 
Tim and Carol Baker's property (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Baker") up to a fence 
line based upon claims of adverse possession, boundary by acquiescence, and reformation of 
Coleman's warranty deeds. 
The following are depictions of the parcels and the "Disputed Property:" 
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Baker has filed this Appeal requesting that the Supreme Court scrutinize the District 
Court's finding that in conveying the property to Coleman, her predecessor's in interest, Harry 
and Edith Clark, intended to convey up to the fence line identified in the above survey. Baker 
contends that this finding is clearly erroneous, as it is not based upon competent evidence 
admitted at trial. 
Coleman has cross-appealed, asserting that the District Court erred by finding that she had 
failed to prove her claim of boundary by agreement/acquiescence by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
III. ARGUMENT - REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
A. The District Court's Finding that the Clarks intended to Convey to Coleman all of the 
Property up to the Fence Line is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence. 
Respondent Coleman's primary argument in response to the Baker's appeal is to contend 
that the District Court's decision is supported by substantial evidence. This argument, however, 
ignores a fundamental and inescapable conclusion at the time that Harry and Edith Clark gifted 
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the property to Coleman, they could not have intended to convey up to the fence, because the 
fence did not yet exist. Although the District Court recognized that the fence had not yet been 
built at the time of the conveyance, it nevertheless ruled that the Clarks intended to convey up 
the fence. That finding is not supported by any competent evidence admitted at trial, and is 
clearly erroneous. 
It is undisputed that Coleman acquired her Southern parcel by Warranty Deed from her 
parents, Harry and Edith Clark, which was executed on December 23rd, 1970. (Ex. 3; Tr., p. 
1022, L. 7 - L.16) (hereinafter "Coleman Deed"). Unfortunately, the Coleman Deed, which was 
drafted by Harry Clark who was not a surveyor, is ambiguous, in that it contains a call to the 
"Boundary of Highway 130," which cannot be reconciled with the distance and bearing call 
identified in the Coleman Deed as "the point of true beginning." 
The District Court properly recognized that its role in interpreting an ambiguous deed is 
to attempt to ascertain the intent of the grantors - in this case, Harry and Edith Clark. One of the 
questions before the District Court, therefore, was what the Clarks intended to convey to Jean 
Coleman when they gifted her the property on December 23rd , 1970. 
At the conclusion of trial in this matter, the District Court found that Harry and Edith 
Clark intended to convey to Jean Coleman land up to a fence line, even though the Coleman 
Deed contains no reference to any fence. This legal conclusion, however, is not supported by the 
evidence admitted at trial, or even by the District Court's own findings of fact. 
The crux of the District Court's error is in its conclusion that the Clarks could have 
intended to convey up to a fence that had not yet been built at the time of the conveyance. As the 
District Court found, the subject fence was not built until approximately a year after the property 
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was gifted by the Clarks to Coleman. (Tr., pp. 1040-1041). This finding of fact by the District 
Court is not seriously in dispute, with the Respondent having conceded that it was, in fact, Cliff 
Johnson who built the fence, and that Johnson did not build the fence until after he purchased the 
property adjoining Coleman's parcel on September 3,1971. (Ex. 7; Tr., pp. 1040-1041; R,.Vol. 
V., Bates 884-885; Respondent's Brief~ p. 2 ("In 1971, after purchasing their northernmost 
parcel, Clifford Johnson built a fence.")). 
Having established that the fence had not yet been built at the time that the Clarks 
conveyed Coleman's property to her, how could the Clarks have intended to convey up to a non-
existent fence line? There are only two ways in which this could have occurred: (1) if the Clarks 
had some part in determining where Cliff Johnson would eventually construct the fence; or (2) if 
Cliff Johnson knew where the Clarks had intended the boundary line to be located, and he chose 
to install the fence on exactly that location. 
As to the first possibility, there was no evidence admitted at trial that either Harry or 
Edith Clark participated in any manner in the construction of the fence. Moreover, Cliff Johnson 
testified at trial that he never discussed with the Clarks either the location of the Northern 
boundary of the property, or the location of the fence that Mr. Johnson subsequently constructed. 
(Tr., p. 385, L. 9-23, p. 392, L. 18-22). Thus, there is no evidence in the record which would 
support a finding that the Clarks had any role in establishing the location of the fence line. 
This leaves only the possibility that Cliff Johnson knew where Harry Clark intended the 
boundary line to be, and so built the fence in that location. Again, however, no evidence to 
support such a finding was admitted at trial. Cliff Johnson testified that he located the fence 
based upon the topography of the land, which was wet, marshy, and contains a gully, and for the 
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sole purpose of penning the Johnson's horses. (Tr., pp. 385-386, 390, 395-396, 413-416). The 
fence is indisputably not located in the location described in the deeds drafted by Harry Clark as 
the boundary line to be. The deeds describe a boundary that runs due west. The fence, on the 
other hand, runs in a Southwesterly direction, more than 23 degrees counterclockwise from due 
West. Moreover, the fence does not follow a straight line, but turns in a fish hook pattern, 
defying any description to be found in either deed, and demonstrating clearly that the fence was 
not intended to mark a boundary line. 
Perhaps most importantly, the District Court made findings of fact that the Johnsons were 
unaware of the location of the boundary at the time that the fence was being constructed. (R.Yoi. 
VI., Bates 1097). If Cliff Johnson did not know the location of the boundary, had never 
discussed the location with the Clarks, and could not derive the location from reviewing either 
his deed or the Coleman deed, then Cliff Johnson could not have constructed the fence line 
along the exact location of where Harry Clark intended the boundary to be located. Mr. 
Johnson was not a clairvoyant, and simply did not have any information that would have allowed 
him to construct the fence precisely along what the District Court found to be the Clarks' 
intended boundary line. This finding simply does not withstand scrutiny, and is not supported by 
the evidence admitted at trial 
Despite these facts, the District Court nevertheless concluded that the Clarks intended to 
convey up to the fence line a conclusion which is not supported by the evidence admitted at 
trial, and is clearly erroneous. To put it succinctly, the Clarks could not have intended to convey 
up to a fence that did not exist at the time of the conveyance. 
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In fact, in response to the Bakers' Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court 
recognized that its legal conclusion was problematic in light of its finding that the fence was not 
constructed until approximately a year after Coleman acquired her property. In response to 
Baker's first Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court made the following findings: 
With these ambiguities in place, this Court is required to decipher 
the intent of the grantor, Harry Clark. The starting point is the 
deeds. The Bakers are correct in their analysis that it would not 
have been Harry Clark's intent to establish a boundary line to 
a fence that was not in place at the time of the conveyance. 
They are also correct that the driveway and parking area adjacent 
to the cabin were similarly not in existence at the time the 
conveyances were made. 
(R., Vol. V, pp. 884-885). 
Despite these findings, the District Court nevertheless erroneously concluded: 
[O]n a more probable than not basis, it was Harry Clark's intention 
to convey property at least to the fence line that was later placed 
by Cliff Johnson. This fence line resulted in the Johnsons using 
the property up to the fence line to the North and Jean Coleman 
similarly limiting her use of the real property up to the fence line 
on the South. 
(Id., at p. 885) (emphasis added). 
To reach this conclusion, the District Court relied upon improvements that were 
constructed subsequent to the conveyance by the Clarks to Coleman, which is indicative of the 
error in the District Court's reasoning. (R., Vol. V, pp. 884-885). The intent of the grantor must 
be determined from what the grantor could have known at the time of the conveyance. An 
exception to this might be found in actions taken by the grantors themselves after the 
conveyance, but no such evidence was admitted at trial. 
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The District Court repeatedly conflates the proof required for a boundary by 
agreement/acquiescence claim, with evidence relevant to the interpretation of an ambiguous 
deed. What Jean Coleman or her invitees may have done with regard to her property in the years 
following her acquisition thereof is simply not relevant to what Harry and Edith Clark intended. 
The District Court erroneously relied upon evidence which is relevant in its analysis of 
Coleman's boundary by agreement/acquiescence claim i.e. the use of the property by 
subsequent owners in analyzing what the Clarks intended to convey on December 23, 1970, 
when they deeded the property to Coleman. 
The analysis of the grantor's intent must begin with the language in the deed itself, and 
adhere as closely as possible to the calls in the deed. Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc., 118 Idaho 
at 120, 794 P.2d at 1393 ("When construing a deed description, effect must be given, if possible, 
to all of the language contained in the description."); Miller v. Bay City Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 
393 Md. 620, 637, 903 A.2d 938 (2006) ("In determining the intent of the parties we must begin 
with the actual language used in the deed[.]"); City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, 13 
Cal. 4th 232, 238, 914 P.2d 160, 164 (1996) ("Extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret the 
instrument, but not to give it a meaning to which it is not susceptible, and it is the instrument 
itself that must be given effect."). Parole evidence can be considered, but only such evidence that 
was available to the Clarks at the time of the conveyance, or perhaps evidence of actions taken 
by the Clarks thereafter. The District Court is not at liberty to completely redefine the 
boundaries of the Coleman parcel, simply because the deed contains a conflicting call. That is 
precisely what the District Court did here, and this error requires the reversal of the District 
Court's original decision. 
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B. The Appellant is Not Asking the Court to Reweigh the Evidence; Rather, the Appellant 
is Asking the Court to Recognize the Lack of any Substantial Evidence Supporting the 
Court Legal Conclusion. 
The Respondent Boyd-Davis contends that Baker is asking the Court to "reweigh the 
evidence." (Respondent's Brief, p. 34). This is not the case. Baker readily acknowledges that 
the reviewing Court will not overturn the decision of a District Court where the findings of fact 
are based on substantial evidence. However, the Court "exercises free review over the lower 
court's conclusions of law to determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable law, and 
whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found." Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 
Idaho 265,269-70,985 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (1999). The District Court's legal conclusion that 
the Clarks intended to convey up to a non-existent fence is not sustained by the facts found, and 
must be overturned. 
C. No Evidence Was Admitted at Trial Supporting a Finding that the Fence Line Existed 
at the Time of Conveyance. 
The Respondent Boyd-Davis argues that "the fence line existed at the time of the 
conveyance." (Respondent's Brief, p. 20). Yet, she fails to provide any citation to the record, 
and this argument directly contradicts the District Court's findings. (Tr., pp. 1040-1041; R.Voi. 
V., Bates 884-885). In fact, in the brief she submitted in this appeal, Ms. Boyd-Davis concedes 
that it was Mr. Johnson that built the fence. (Respondent's Brief, p. 16)("[The District Court] 
considered the testimony of Clifford Johnson, predecessor to the Bakers, who had built the fence 
that stood on the 'fence line''')). 
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D. The Respondent's Expert Opinion is Based Upon the Assumption that is Not 
Supported by the Evidence. 
Boyd-Davis also contends that the District Court's decision is supported by the testimony 
of Coleman's surveyor, Robert Stratton. (Respondent's Brief, p. 18). Yet, as Mr. Stratton 
testified at trial, his opinion as to the intent of the Clarks is based upon evidence that did not exist 
at the time that the Clarks conveyed the property to Coleman. (Ex. 16; Tr., pp.79 - 80,85). This 
includes the cabin, which by all accounts was not located on the property until after Coleman 
acquired it (Respondent's Brief, p. 9), the parking lot for the cabin, and the road leading to the 
cabin. Mr. Stratton's opinion was also based upon the location of the Pack River Road. 
However, the evidence admitted at trial proved that this road had moved, having washed out on 
numerous occasions (Tr., pp. 112, 151,258,259,312,313,741,742,800-801), been widened, 
paved and realigned (Tr., pp. 800-801, 87}. L. 11-15) in the years between 1970 when the 
Coleman deed was drafted, and 2010. In fact, Mr. Stratton admitted that the location of the road 
in 2010 was "definitely" different than where it was located at the time the Clarks conveyed the 
property to Coleman. (Tr., p. 97). 
Nevertheless, Stratton's Figure 6 is based upon his decision to "arbitrarily" locate the 
edge of the Pack River Road 30 feet from its current center line. (Tr., p. 55, L. 2-21). Stratton's 
reliance upon features that existed in 2010, but did not exist in 1970, are, therefore, clearly 
erroneous if the goal is to derive what was the intent of the grantor in 1970. That intent must be 
derived solely from what the grantor knew at the time, or the grantor's subsequent actions, not 
the actions of others, or improvements that were later constructed. 
Most importantly, Stratton's Figure 6, which was adopted by the District Court, which 
required Mr. Stratton to, in his own words, "arbitrarily" rotate the entire legal description 23 
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degrees counterclockwise, so that the southern boundary of Coleman's parcel would fall 
"roughly" along the fence line. (Tr., pp. 107-108). Thus, Stratton's opinion is based upon an 
assumption that the Clarks knew where the fence was located. That assumption is erroneous, as 
the fence was not built until after the conveyance. The Clarks simply could not have known 
where Mr. Johnson was going to build it, and therefore could not have intended that the fence 
mark the boundary. Consequently, Mr. Stratton's opinion does not provide a valid evidentiary 
basis for upholding the decision of the District Court. 
E. The Respondent's Assertion that Baker Relies Upon an Incorrect Survey is Without 
Merit. 
The Respondent Boyd-Davis argues repeatedly that Appellant Baker has erroneously 
based its argument on the wrong survey. (Respondent's Brief, p. 21-30). This is incorrect. 
Ironically, the survey that Boyd-Davis asserts is the correct survey is not part of the 
Record for this appeal. In her brief, she contends that two surveys were submitted to the District 
Court by her expert, Robert Stratton. (Id., at 22-24). She asserts that the "new survey" is part of 
the Record at "R., Vol. IV, pp. 1129-1131, Exhibit A." However, the Record at Vol. IV, pp. 
I 129-113 I, contains neither a survey nor an Exhibit A. Rather that part of the Record contains 
only a Notice filed by Ms. Boyd-Davis and a letter to the District Court from the surveyor. The 
survey to which Boyd-Davis apparently references is not otherwise found in the Record. 
Despite not being included in the Record, Ms. Boyd-Davis includes what she contends to 
be a depiction of this "new survey" in her brief. (Respondent's Brief. pp. 25, 35). It is, of course, 
improper for a party in an appeal to include evidence which is not part of the Record. 
However, whether the Court considers the depiction contained within Ms. Boyd-Davis' 
brief, or the Stratton Survey that is actually part ofthe record (R., Vol. VI, Bates 971), it is clear 
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that the District Court' s conclusion that the Clarks intended to convey up to the fence line is 
erroneous. As Ms. Boyd points out, the District Court rejected certain portions of the Stratton 
survey in its Memorandum Decision re: Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Judgment 
CR. , Vol. VI, pp. 1075-1084), the effect of which was to remove the western portion of the 
Disputed Property from its original award to Coleman, and quiet title to this western portion of 
the Disputed Property to the Bakers, as follows : 
Portion of Disputed 
Property Quieted to 
Baker 
Even without this western portion of the Disputed Property, the resulting parcel of 
property quieted to Coleman remains a bizarrely shaped parcel, albeit extending only 225 feet 
along the southern Boundary, rather than the 261.02 feet as shown on Stratton' s survey, with the 
resultant Coleman property still shaped as follows: 
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Absolutely nothing in the language of the Coleman Deeds gives any indication that such 
an oddly shaped property was being conveyed, and no evidence at trial was admitted which 
supports a finding that Harry Clark intended to convey a property of this shape. 
Although the survey referenced by Ms. Boyd-Davis is not contained in the record, the 
legal description of the property quieted to Coleman is found in the Partial Judgment issued by 
the District Court. (R., Vol. VI, Bates 1129-1132; R. Vol. VII., Bates 1200-1203). A direct 
comparison of the deed drafted by Harry Clark with the legal description contained in the Partial 
Judgment reveals that the District Court's interpretation of Harry Clark's intent abandons nearly 
every call in the deeds drafted by Harry Clark, in favor of arbitrarily rotating the legal 
description to fit a fence line that did not exist at the time the Clarks conveyed the property to 
Coleman. 
While the Coleman Deeds are admittedly ambiguous because the call to the point of true 
beginning conflicts with the call to the highway, this does not justify the complete abandonment 
of nearly every call in the deed. Any interpretation of the deeds must give effect to as many of 
the calls in the deeds as is reasonably possible. Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc., 118 Idaho at 120, 
794 P.2d at 1393 ("When construing a deed description, effect must be given, if possible, to all 
of the language contained in the description."). It is simply not reasonable to find that the deed 
contains an implied call to a fence line, when no such call is indicated, the fence did not exist at 
the time of the conveyance, and the location of the fence constitutes a radical departure from the 
actual calls in the deeds. The District Court's findings in this regard are therefore, clearly 
erroneous. 
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F. The District Court's "Alternative Decision" is Sound, and Should be Adopted, or the 
Case Remanded. 
As there is no evidence in the record from which the District Court could reasonably 
conclude that the Clarks intended to convey to Coleman up to the not yet built fence, the Court 
must either remand for further proceedings, or adopt the District Court's "Alterative Decision." 
(R. Vol. VI., Bates pp. 1091-1097). Unlike the District Court's erroneous conclusions regarding 
the intent of the grantors, the Alternative Decision results in an interpretation of the deeds that 
holds nearly all of the calls in the Coleman Deed, resulting in an overlap of the Coleman and 
Baker parcels, depicted as follows: 
Plaintiffs' 
Trial Exhibit 23 
(R. Vol. VI, Bates p. 1092). 
Because the Coleman Deed was recorded prior to the Johnson Deed, it is superior and 
Coleman owns that portion of the Disputed Property located within the overlap. Moreover, the 
District Court found that Coleman has acquired by adverse possession under the color of "'Titten 
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instrument the portion of the Disputed Property which is depicted as the overlap, but not the 
remainder ofthe disputed property. (R. Vol. VI., Bates pp. 1091-1097). 
Ms. Boyd-Davis does not address the legal basis adopted by the District Court in this 
Alternative Decision, in which the District Court found that: 
The Court finds and concludes in this alternative decision that the 
legal descriptions overlap, as depicted in Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 
23 ... [and that] the evidence and testimony presented provides 
clear and convincing proof that the 'overlap' portion of the 
disputed property was adversely possessed by the plaintiffs under a 
written claim of title, and this Court so finds and concludes. The 
Court further finds and concludes that all of the material elements 
necessary to establish a claim of adverse possession involving the 
area of overlap were proven with clear and convincing evidence. 
(R. Vol. VI., Bates pp. 1092-1093). 
Ms. Boyd-Davis provides no argument to refute these findings of the District Court, and 
points to no evidence from which the Supreme Court could find that the District Court erred in 
reaching this conclusion. Ms. Boyd-Davis' lack of any legal challenge to the Alternative 
Decision is indicative of its soundness. The Appellant Baker respectfully submits that this Court 
should adopt this Alternative Decision, rather than remand the case for a retrial. Unless this 
Alternative Decision is adopted, however, this matter must be remanded for further proceedings. 
IV. ARGUMENT - RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL 
A. The District Court's Finding that Coleman Failed to Prove her Claim of Boundary 
by Acquiescence is Supported by Substantial Evidence. 
The Cross-Appellant Boyd-Davis appeals the District Court's finding that Coleman had 
failed to prove her claim of boundary by agreement/acquiescence. (Respondent's Brief, p 34-43). 
Boyd-Davis argues that the District Court failed to recognize that a claim for boundary by 
agreement can be based upon an implied agreement, and erroneously rejected the claim solely 
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based on the lack of evidence of an express agreement between Coleman and the Johnsons. (ld). 
In so arguing, Boyd-Davis grossly misconstrues the District Court's ruling, ignoring the District 
Court's express findings, and citing only to a portion of the District Court's decision. 
1. Standard of Review 
This Court will only set aside a trial court's findings of fact if they are clearly erroneous. 
I.R.C.P. 52(a) (2002); McCray v. Rosenkrance, 135 Idaho 509, 513, 20 P.3d 693,697 (2001); In 
re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 Idaho 452, 454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 (2001). In deciding 
whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court determines whether the findings are 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. In re Williamson, at 454, 19 P.3d at 768. Evidence 
is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it. ld. Findings based on 
substantial and competent evidence, although conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal. Bolger 
v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792,53 P.3d 1211,1213 (2002). 
2. Elements of the Claim of Boundary by Agreement/Acquiescence. 
Boundary by agreement or acquiescence has two elements: (1) there must be an uncertain 
or disputed boundary and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary. Luce v. Marble, 142 
Idaho 264, 271, 127 P.3d 167 (2005), citing Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 494-95,50 P.3d 987, 
989-90 (2002). "Idaho case law demonstrates that an agreement, either express or implied, must 
exist to establish a boundary by agreement or acquiescence." Cox, 137 Idaho at 495 (emphasis 
added). "Since there must be an agreement, acquiescence 'is merely regarded as competent 
evidence of the agreement,' and alone is not enough to establish a boundary by agreement." 
Flying Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 13,232 P.3d 330, 334 (2010). The party seeking 
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to establish boundary by agreement has the burden of proving these elements by clear and 
convincing evidence. Luce, 142 Idaho at 270-71, 127 P.3d at 173-74. 
3. The District Court Did not Fail to Consider Whether an Implied Agreement 
had Been Proven by Clear and Convincing Evidence. 
In finding that Coleman had failed to prove her claim of boundary by 
agreement/acquiescence, the District Court explicitly and repeatedly recognized that a claim for 
boundary by agreement/acquiescence may be established by proof of either an express 
agreement or an implied agreement. In the District Court's first of two written decisions on the 
issue, it quoted, in bold, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Flying Elk Investment, LLC, v. 
Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 232 P.3d 330 (2010), recognizing that "[t]he agreement may be either 
express or implied by the landowner's conduct." (emphasis added). (R. Vol. VI., Bates pp. 
1096-1097). It is clear, therefore, that the District Court was not under the mistaken belief that 
Coleman could only prove this claim with proof of an express agreement. 
found: 
In analyzing whether Coleman had proven the elements of this claim, the District Court 
[W]hile Cliff Johnson's testimony is not totally believable, many 
portions of it were accepted by the Court. The only way a 
decision can be rendered that an agreement was made between 
Jean Coleman and the Johnsons that the fence line was the 
boundary line is to accept an "implied [agreement]" or 
acquiescence version of the facts. Even if such a finding is made, 
as set forth in Flying Elk Investment , LLC, v. Cornwall, 
acquiescense alone is not enough to establish a boundary by 
agreement. In light of the denial by Cliff Johnson that there was an 
agreement between the neighbors that the fence line was to be the 
property, and little to no corroboration that an agreement was 
made to treat the fence line as the boundary, the conclusion is 
reached that the plaintiffs did not prove a necessary and material 
element of this claim. Therefore, due to the presence of contrary 
testimony and evidence, the conclusion is reached that the 
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plaintiffs did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that a 
boundary by agreement/acquiescence resulted. Therefore, the 
second element of proof is not met. 
(R., Vol. VI, Bates 1098) (emphasis added). 
The District Court explicitly considered whether Coleman had proven that an implied 
agreement to treat the fence as the boundary line existed. The District Court found that 
Coleman had failed to prove the claim by clear and convincing evidence. Contrary to the 
contentions of Ms. Boyd-Davis, this conclusion was not based upon an erroneous understanding 
ofthe law. 
In response to the District Court's ruling, Coleman filed a Motion for Reconsideration, in 
which she set forth precisely the same arguments that she includes as the basis for this cross 
appeal - namely, her contention that the District Court erroneously based its decision solely upon 
the lack of evidence of an express agreement, while ignoring evidence of an implied agreement. 
In its second written decision on this issue, the District Court again expressly recognized 
that under Idaho law, a claim for boundary by agreement/acquiescence may be established with 
sufficient proof of an implied agreement: 
To prove boundary by agreement, there must be an uncertain 
or disputed boundary and a subsequent agreement fixing the 
boundary. The agreement need not be express, but may be 
implied by the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the 
parties. 
Idaho case law demonstrates that an agreement, either express 
or implied, must exist to establish a boundary by agreement or 
acquiescence. 
(R., Vol. VII, Bates 1192-1193) (emphasis in original)( quoting Cox, 137 Idaho at 494-95, 50 
P.3d at 989-90 (2002)). 
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In denying Boyd-Davis' Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court again found that 
Coleman had failed to prove the elements of a claim for boundary by agreement/acquiescence. In 
doing so, the District Court analyzed the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions of Cox, supra, and 
Huskinson v. Nelson, 152 Idaho 547,272 P.3d 519 (2012). (R. VII., Bates 1191-1196). As 
noted by this Court in Cox, "the long existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary, in the 
absence of any evidence as to the manner or circumstances of its original location, strongly 
suggests that the fence was located as a boundary by agreement." Cox, 137 Idaho at 495,50 P.3d 
at 990. However, where, as here, the circumstances surrounding the creation of the fence are 
known, this presumption does not arise. As explained by the Supreme Court in Cox, and quoted 
by the District Court in its decision: 
In the present case, the district court found that, prior to the survey, 
none of the parties or their predecessors in interest knew the exact 
location of the boundary lines. Although the first element 
necessary to prove boundary by agreement was met, the district 
court found that there was no evidence in the record to support 
the appellants' contention that the fence line constituted a 
subsequent agreement or acquiescence by the parties or that 
there was an absence of evidence regarding the circumstances 
of the fence's original location. In fact, the opposite was true-
a previous owner, Nina, provided evidence of the 
circumstances surrounding the erection of the fence, which 
demonstrated that the fence was hastily put up to contain 
cattle. Her testimony showed that the purpose of the fence was 
not to establish a boundary between the properties. She stated 
that no agreement existed between the Anderson family and 
the neighboring landowners to treat the fence line as the 
boundary. 
Appellants urge this Court to adopt the theory of boundary by 
acquiescence as a separate theory that does not require the element 
of an agreement. However, Idaho case law demonstrates that an 
agreement, either express or implied, must exist to establish a 
boundary by agreement or acquiescence. Although the actual 
boundary was uncertain, appellants are unable to establish the 
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existence of an express or implied agreement to treat the fence as 
the boundary. Appellants' testimony shows that, even during the 
time they were making the improvements, the fence was still being 
used to contain cattle; appellants knew this because they damaged 
the fence while working, allowing cattle to escape. Nina testified 
that her family used the land outside the fence to access recreation 
areas and that her family never treated the fence as the boundary to 
the property. Affidavits from predecessors in interest submitted by 
the appellants also do not reveal any express or implied agreement 
to treat the fence as a boundary. 
The district court found that the appellants had not established that 
an express or implied agreement existed or that the parties or their 
predecessors in interest had acquiesced to the fence representing 
the boundary between the properties. We affirm the district court's 
decision. 
(R., Vol. VII, Bates 1192-1193) (emphasis in original)(quoting Cox 137 Idaho at 494-4955,50 
P.3d at 989-990). 
The District Court held that Cox is "directly on point,", and found: 
Here, Clifford Johnson testified at trial that the fence was erected 
to contain horses and the shape of the fence was based upon the 
topography of the land, which contained a gully. He also testified 
that the fence was never intended to mark a boundary line. This 
evidence as to the manner and circumstances of the fence's 
original location is the only testimony addressing the purpose of 
the fence. Even though Mr. Johnson's testimony was impeached at 
trial, this Court does not reject his entire testimony. The fact that 
Mr. Johnson testified as to his version of how the fence was placed 
leads to the conclusion that it is uncertain as to whether there was 
indeed a "boundary by agreement." As stated in Huskinson, 
acquiescence for a long period of time "does not necessarily tip 
the scales in favor of the encroaching party." 152 Idaho at 443, 
272 P.3d at 525. It was the plaintiffs' burden of proof to 
establish all of the material elements of boundary by 
agreement. They did not sustain the required burden that 
there was a boundary by agreement according to Idaho law. 
In light of Clifford Johnson's testimony, the earlier finding that the 
plaintiffs did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
fence line was erected as boundary remains in effect. 
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(R., Vol. VII, Bates 1195-1196, emphasis added). 
The case of Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 271-72, 127 P .3d 167, 174-75 (2005) is also 
instructive on this issue. In Luce, the Idaho Supreme Court explained the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence as the application of two presumptions. 
For nearly a century it has been the law of this state that evidence 
of a long established fence creates two presumptions. First, when a 
fence line has been erected, and then coterminous landowners have 
treated that fence line as fixing the boundary between their 
properties "for such a length of time that neither ought to be 
allowed to deny the correctness of its location" the law presumes 
an agreement fixing that fence line as the boundary. (Internal 
citations omitted). 
Second, coupled with the long existence and recognition of a fence 
as a boundary, "the want of any evidence as to the manner or 
circumstances of its original location, the law presumes that it 
was originally located as a boundary by agreement because of 
uncertainty or dispute as to the true line." Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 
75 Idaho at 241,270 P.2d at 835. 
Here, the specific facts of the case prevent this presumption from 
operating in Luce's favor. The doctrine of boundary by agreement 
or acquiescence is based on a reasonable assumption implied 
from the surrounding circumstances. See Griffe!, 136 Idaho at 
400, 34 P .3d at 1083. In our prior cases, we have applied the 
presumption when it was reasonable to assume from the facts on 
the ground that at some prior point landowners agreed or 
acquiesced to a certain location as the boundary between their 
properties. However, the shape of Parcel A is so irregular and 
encompasses such a large portion of the Marble property that 
such an assumption would be unreasonable. Therefore, since 
Luce cannot rely on this presumption and failed to present any 
evidence the fence lines surrounding Parcel A settled an actual 
disagreement or uncertainty, she cannot establish her right to 
Parcel A through boundary by agreement or acquiescence. 
Luce, 142 Idaho at 271-72,127 P.3d at 174-75 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, in Griffin v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 376, 378-79, 162 P.3d 755, 757-58 (2007), 
the Idaho Supreme Court relied upon its decision in Cox in affirming the district court's finding 
that evidence that a fence was built to contain livestock, rather than as a boundary marker, 
defeats a claim for boundary by agreement. 
As Cox demonstrates, a period of long acquiescence is not 
sufficient to overcome clear evidence of a lack of agreement. Like 
Cox, this case does not suffer from an absence of evidence as to 
how the fence came to be located in the first place. The trial court 
heard evidence on the circumstances of the fence's construction; 
indeed, the Andersons constructed the fence themselves, and 
testified that they were prompted to erect their fence as a barrier 
for their livestock and not to mark the boundary of their land. 
While the evidence suggests that the fence acted as both a 
barrier and a boundary, there is substantial and competent 
evidence to support the district court's finding that the fence 
served as a barrier first and foremost. Consequently, we agree 
with the district court that the parties did not form an 
agreement by acquiescence and that the doctrine of boundary 
by agreement does not apply. 
Griffin, 144 Idaho at 378-79, 162 P.3d at 757-58 (emphasis added). 
Because the lohnsons established the circumstances surrounding the creation of the fence 
(R., Vol. VII, Bates 1196; Tr., pp. 385-386, 390, 395-396,413-416, 1029), and testified that it 
was installed to pen the lohnson's horses, rather than to mark a boundary line, no presumption 
arises that would support the finding that the fence was originally located as a boundary by 
agreement. See also Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 595, 166 P.3d 382, 385 (2007) ("The 
mere act of erecting the fence inside his boundary line did not constitute an abandonment of his 
land lying outside the fence, nor did it constitute an agreement that the adjoining landowners can 
have that land."). Lacking any presumption that the fence was intended to mark a boundary, it 
was Coleman's burden to establish from the evidence an agreement between the parties, either 
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implied or express. The District Court found that Coleman failed to meet this burden. (R., Vol. 
VII, Bates 1195-1196). This finding is supported by substantial and competent evidence 
admitted at trial. 
Evidence admitted at trial demonstrated that the fence was, in fact, used to pen the 
10hnsons' horses. Cr. pp. 385-386, 390, 395-396, 413-416). There was a picture admitted at trial 
which shows an adolescent Terry Boyd-Davis and the 10hnsons' daughter with the horses, up 
against the subject fence, demonstrating that, in fact, the fence did pen the lohnson's horses. 
(See D 's Ex. NN) . Consequently, the Court' s findings are supported by substantial evidence. 
Moreover, the evidence admitted at trial demonstrated only sporadic use of the cabin. The 
oldest pictures available, (Ex .. 34), which were taken in the 1970's, show parking and camping 
next to the cabin, but no evidence that Ms. Coleman or her guests used any of the property near 
the fence line. The field between the cabin and the fence does not appear to have been mowed or 
otherwise cultivated, and no improvements were made in that area. In fact , the only pictures 
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which show any use of the property near the fence are clearly very recent, as is obvious from the 
vehicles pictured therein. (Ex. 35, 36). 
Coleman's other evidence as to the use of the Disputed Property consists primarily of 
conclusory statements of Coleman's witnesses, to the effect that they have "always" visited the 
property, and that the fence "was always used as a boundary." (Tr. pp. 439, L. 6-10; 458, L. 5-
13). Such testimony is of no evidentiary value, as it lacks foundation. Moreover, this testimony 
was directly contradicted by the Bakers' witnesses. For example, Mary Pandrea confirmed that 
when Bob Camp moved onto the Coleman property in the mid-1990's, the cabin was in a state of 
utter disrepair. (Tr. pp. 805-807). Mr. Camp's pictures, admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibits 44 and 
45, confirm this. Ms. Pandrea further testified that after the death of Mr. Camp, the property sat 
unused for many years, until she moved onto the property for a brief period. (Tr. pp. 805-807). 
She testified that the cabin had rotten meat in the refrigerator left by Bob Camp, a rat's nest in 
the oven, and rat feces throughout the cabin. (ld.). This unrefuted testimony directly contradicts 
the conclusory statements of Coleman's witnesses who claim to have used the cabin and the 
Disputed Property frequently throughout the years. 
Consequently, the District Court's finding that Coleman failed to prove her claim of 
boundary by agreement/acquiescence by the requisite clear and convincing evidence is supported 
by substantial evidence. The District Court's ruling, in this regard, should be affirmed. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Bakers respectfully submit that the decision of the District 
Court is clearly erroneous and not based upon substantial evidence. Consequently, the Bakers 
request that the Supreme Court reverse that decision and either adopt the District Court's 
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Alternative Decision, or remand with instructions to the District Court to make a determination 
of the Grantor's intent based only upon evidence that the Clarks could have considered when 
drafting the deeds by which they conveyed the property to Coleman. 
Appellant/Cross-Respondent Baker requests that this Court affirm the District Court's 
findings that Coleman failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence her claim of boundary by 
agreement/acquiescence. These findings are supported by substantial evidence admitted at trial. 
DATED this 
~=--
of February, 2014. 
BERG & McLAUGHLIN CHTD. 
By:_~L-...._'-:-________ ==---
T Y McLaughlin, Attorneys for 
~ppellants/cross-Respondents Baker 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On Februar):~":;:J), 2014, I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served by the 
following methods on the parties listed below as follows, which is the last known address for the 
listed party: 
Terri Boyd-Davis D By Hand Delivery 
12738 N. Strahorn Rd. ~ By U.S. Mail 
Hayden, 10 83835 D By Overnight Mail 
Plaintiff D By Facsimile Transmission 
D Other 
Brian F. Davis D By Hand Delivery 
12738 N. Strahorn Rd. ~ By U.S. Mail 
Hayden, ID 83835 D By Overnight Mail 
Plaint[iJ D By Facsimile Transmission 
D Other 
Jean L. Coleman D By Hand Delivery 
2902 N. 5th Ave., 4~SLBy U.S. Mail 
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83814 D By Overnight Mail 
Plaintiff D By Facsimile Transmission 
D Other 
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